

RECOMMENDATION 786¹

on NATO: Transformation and strategic partnership with the EU – reply to the annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the wide consensus among EU and NATO member states about the main threats and security challenges that face them, while acknowledging they may have different views about the means of dealing with such threats and challenges;
- (ii) Considering that both NATO and the EU are facing a growing demand for their crisis-management capabilities and that the EU in particular is increasingly being asked to facilitate negotiations, broker agreements and supervise their implementation;
- (iii) Taking the view that not only are NATO and the EU's European Security and Defence Policy there to protect member states from the above threats, but that they provide a framework in which the two organisations can forge a strategic partnership with a particular emphasis on coordinating civilian and military responses to crisis and conflicts;
- (iv) Convinced that a range of instruments, military and civilian, is needed to deal with today's security challenges and perturbed at the overall shortage of civil and military capabilities that is limiting both organisations' capacity to intervene;
- (v) Persuaded that the members of both organisations should cooperate both among themselves and with other countries so as to have the best possible combination of instruments available to them;
- (vi) Aware that the EU and NATO have yet to find a *modus vivendi* and that their relationship will evolve as NATO's transformation proceeds and the ESDP acquires greater importance;
- (vii) Considering that NATO remains the cornerstone of the security and defence of its members and that all NATO and EU member countries need a strong NATO, but also of the view that the organisation cannot deal with every aspect of security and defence and that currently not all member countries are in favour of its handling non-military aspects of security;
- (viii) Noting that with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, 21 out of the 26 NATO countries are also member states of the European Union, but acknowledging that NATO and the EU are different kinds of organisations which have developed different security and defence cultures in consequence;
- (ix) Believing firmly that there is no room for competition between the EU and NATO and that the future of the Alliance is dependent not so much on the further development of the ESDP but on the attitudes of NATO members themselves;
- (x) Believing that the time when NATO and the ESDP called one another's existence into question is over and that there is now need for a policy combining a new NATO with a new EU;
- (xi) Taking the view that no geographic area should be the exclusive province of either organisation, while recognising that current capabilities place limits on ESDP activities, particularly in terms of large scale deployment of military forces in remote and high intensity operations;
- (xii) Convinced that the future development of NATO and the ESDP requires the full understanding and support of public opinion in NATO and EU member states;
- (xiii) Recalling the vital role parliamentarians can play in explaining to the citizens of those states the importance of investment in prevention and development, as well as in security and defence;
- (xiv) Stressing the importance of development for security and noting that insufficient progress is being made towards achieving the Millennium Goals and that most EU and NATO countries need to step up their efforts to meet commitment targets for increased official development aid;

¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 18 December 2006 at the 5th sitting.

(xv) Stressing the need to strengthen policies of prevention and in the belief that fighting poverty and misery is an end in itself and that a coherent policy on development and good governance increases security and reduces the potential for conflict;

(xvi) Noting also that while NATO's current strategic concept dates back to 1999, the doctrinal documents adopted by the United States and the European Union are of more recent date, and believing that debate and work on a revised strategic concept for NATO would provide the opportunity for reconfirmation of shared values and adaptation of NATO's role to the new security environment;

(xvii) Welcoming the EU's objective of always basing its ESDP activities on the United Nations Charter but drawing attention to the fact that the United Nations may not be in a position to give the required mandate;

(xviii) Acknowledging the fact that the close relations that formerly existed between NATO countries in the face of Soviet threat have now given way to a form of cooperation that is looser – although equally determined – which, although still based on many shared values, now must accommodate the more diverse interests of NATO's wider membership and take account of the changes wrought by the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States and of the policies adopted by that country as a result;

(xix) Taking the view that “coalitions of the willing” comprising countries prepared to implement operations – military or civilian – constitute a flexible mechanism which, far from weakening existing structures, is able to reflect the increasing diversity of security interests within them as they enlarge, and so help avoid deadlock;

(xx) Emphasising the need for further efforts to improve and deepen interoperability between nations' military forces, including in their treatment of terrorist suspects;

(xxi) Noting that the use of *caveats* (or limitations placed on forces' use) is making operational command more difficult and impeding flexible management of deployed forces and equipment;

(xxii) Deploring the fact that the suspension of the process of ratification of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has left the EU short of certain crucial instruments and procedures that would give its action greater coherence and lead to more efficient decision making;

(xxiii) Believing that efforts to bring the European Constitution back on track must safeguard certain fundamental innovations contained in the draft text designed to achieve more efficient decision making and more coherent cooperation between the different Union bodies;

(xxiv) Noting that in times of peace the power of deterrence of an organisation is determined by the wording of its mutual defence clause, while in times of crisis and conflict the determining factor is the military capabilities available to it;

(xxv) Seriously alarmed by the totally unacceptable declarations made by the President of Iran regarding the Holocaust and the existence of Israel;

(xxvi) Noting that declarations following recent elections to the US Congress open new possibilities with regard to Iraq, yet aware that opinion poll ratings showed unprecedented levels of disaffection in Europe following the US-led intervention in that country, and therefore stressing the need to ensure that the current conciliatory mood is consolidated into a lasting trend to help reverse this adverse drift in public opinion;

(xxvii) Persuaded also that effort is needed to prevent any further weakening of the transatlantic ideological consensus, in particular with regard to the role of international organisations, multilateralism and the treatment of terrorist suspects;

(xxviii) Considering it would be timely to initiate practical cooperation between the United States and Europeans in the field of civilian crisis management;

(xxix) Taking the view that ESDP development will serve to strengthen further the capabilities of European NATO members and extend the interoperability of their forces, as well as drawing in

European non-NATO countries such that their capabilities become available for Euro-Atlantic security cooperation;

(xxx) Recalling that Turkey, an EU candidate country and associate member of WEU seeking to participate in the work of the European Defence Agency (EDA), is an erstwhile full member of the former WEU armaments cooperation bodies WEAG and WEAO, now integrated into EDA;

(xxxi) Noting that worldwide energy demand is growing and that a common approach to energy security is needed from supplier and consumer countries;

(xxxii) Stressing that Afghanistan must be of the highest priority for all NATO and EU member states;

(xxxiii) Concerned by the rise in Taliban power and the support being given to the movement by third countries;

(xxxiv) Concerned at the dependence of the Afghan economy on drug production and trade;

(xxxv) Alarmed by the deteriorating security conditions in Darfur which are seriously hindering the distribution of humanitarian aid;

(xxxvi) Welcoming the decision by the UN Security Council to strengthen UNMIS and regretting that the Sudanese Government is opposing the deployment of a UN force to bring an end to violence in Darfur,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU NATIONS AS CURRENT OR PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS OF THE EU AND NATO TO:

1. Extend the process of improving interoperability of the nations' military forces to include the rules governing the conduct of soldiers and the treatment of terrorist suspects;
2. Make a particular effort to improve interoperability of nations' special forces with respect to common training and common communication;
3. Step up efforts to inform citizens in countries that aspire to NATO membership about the role of the organisation and the advantages of closer ties and future accession;
4. Increase the frequency of informal meetings between EU and NATO member countries from senior administrative to ministerial level as being more suitable for political dialogue than the formal Berlin Plus meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the PSC, where EU member countries are represented by two ambassadors of differing rank and seniority;
5. Move the EU-NATO strategic partnership further along the road towards establishing a transatlantic forum for discussion of security and defence questions in which all member countries take part on an equal basis and widen the discussion to include security issues that do not necessarily require a military response;
6. Encourage the NATO Secretary-General and the EU High Representative to have regular exchanges on current security issues;
7. Develop joint NATO-EU strategic partnership task forces on relations with third countries such as China, India, Pakistan and Russia and on specific issues such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, missile defence, civil-military cooperation and energy security;
8. Appoint double-hatted ambassadors in future to represent European Union member states that are also members of NATO in the North Atlantic Council and on the Political and Security Committee;
9. Urge EU non-NATO member states to launch debates on their own security and defence and that of the Union as a whole, and to explain to their citizens the importance of an unambiguous commitment to mutual security in Europe;

10. Take seriously the emergent global nuclear threat by establishing a European consultation mechanism on the nuclear capabilities of EU member states;
11. Task the North Atlantic Council with initiating work on a new NATO Security Strategy that will set the direction for the organisation's future military role and how it provides protection for the citizens of its member states, and define where, when and how it intends to intervene in crisis situations;
12. Launch a strategic debate on how ESDP and NATO capabilities can be made available within the confines of the European Union in the event of a terrorist attack, or in areas such as air and naval security where there are no police capabilities for defending Union security;
13. Seek to obtain the participation of US police forces in the planned ESDP police mission in Kosovo as a first step towards regular US involvement in ESDP civilian missions;
14. Substantially increase support to Afghanistan, coordinate more closely with the United Nations in order to solve the problem of that country's economic dependence on the drugs trade (a task that is not NATO's responsibility) and make reconstruction, good governance and alternative economic resources for Afghanistan a priority;
15. Draw up a specific concept for the development of those regions in Afghanistan where the current security situation does not allow for the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs);
16. Place fewer *caveats* on the use of their forces in order to make NATO and EU operations more flexible and effective and in order to establish a single *modus operandi*;
17. Recognise that the conditions are met in Darfur for international intervention under the principle of the "responsibility to protect" and signal to the United Nations their readiness to help end the suffering there;
18. Support Turkey's participation in European Defence Agency activities and the transfer of WEAO assets to the EDA;
19. Develop a concept for making NATO and ESDP capabilities available for humanitarian and aid operations in the event of a natural disaster within the European Union;
20. Develop contingency plans for the evacuation of European citizens living in areas outside the Union affected by war;
21. Involve parliamentarians to greater extent and earlier in the analysis of crisis situations and the shaping of responses.